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Abstract
In the field of long-run economic growth, it is common to use historical or geograph-
ical variables as instruments for contemporary endogenous regressors. We study the
interpretation of these conventional instrumental variable (IV) regressions in a simple,
but general, framework. We are interested in estimating the long-run causal e↵ect of
changes in historical conditions. For this purpose, we develop an augmented IV estima-
tor that accounts for the degree of persistence in the endogenous regressor. We apply
our results to estimate the long-run e↵ect of institutions on economic performance.
Using panel data, we find that institutional characteristics are imperfectly persistent,
implying that conventional IV regressions overestimate the long-run causal e↵ect of
institutions. When applying our augmented estimator, we find that increasing con-
straints on executive power from the lowest to the highest level on the standard index
increases national income per capita three centuries later by 1.2 standard deviations.
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1 Introduction
A growing literature examines the determinants of economic development in the long run.1 In this
literature, it is common to use historical or geographic instruments for contemporary endogenous
regressors in instrumental variables (IV) regressions (e.g., Acemoglu et al., 2001; Easterly, 2007;
Tabellini, 2010).2 In this paper, we study the interpretation of these conventional IV regressions,
develop an augmented estimator for long-run causal e↵ects, and apply our findings to estimate the
long-run causal e↵ect of changes in historical institutions.
Despite the prominence of instrumental variable regressions with historical instruments and
contemporary endogenous regressors, specific interpretations are rarely attached to coe cient es-
timates. We provide a simple, but general, framework for interpreting these regressions that is
consistent with existing literature. Our parameter of interest is the ‘long-run e↵ect’ of the endoge-
nous variable, which we define as the causal e↵ect of historical values of the endogenous variable on
the contemporary dependent variable. This is the parameter that would be estimated by standard
IV analysis if the endogenous variable was measured at the time of the initial impact of the instru-
ment. This is also the parameter which provides information about the long-run consequences of
policy interventions or historical events. We find that IV regressions where the endogenous variable
is measured later in time estimate the long-run e↵ect divided by the persistence of the endogenous
variable. We define ‘persistence’ as the causal e↵ect of historical levels of the endogenous variable
on its current level. Our analysis, therefore, shows that accounting for the persistence in the en-
dogenous variable is crucial for estimating long-run causal e↵ects when the endogenous variable is
observed after the e↵ect of the instrument.
Using the intuition from our analytic results, we develop an augmented estimator for the long-
run causal e↵ect of the endogenous variable under common data availability constraints. Specifi-
cally, we consider the case where the endogenous variable is not measured at the time of the original
impact of the instrument. Our new approach corrects the bias of the conventional IV analysis by
accounting for the persistence of the endogenous variable. Our updated estimator uses multiple
equation Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) with a single instrument. One equation esti-
mates the usual regression, while the other directly estimates persistence using observations of the
endogenous variable at two intermediate points in time. Together, these equations allow us to
extract an estimate of the long-run causal e↵ect of the endogenous variable.
We show that our results hold even under certain violations of the exclusion restriction, which
we argue are often empirically relevant in the field of long-run growth. In the presence of these
violations, the long-run e↵ect is the only causal parameter that can be recovered from the regression.
Thus, a key aspect of our study is to demonstrate how to extract interesting economic parameters
under violations of the exclusion restriction.
1For an overview of the literature, see Spolaore and Wacziarg (2013) and Nunn (2014).
2This technique is still popular in the literature (e.g., Becker and Woessmann, 2009; Becker et al., 2010; Naritomi
et al., 2012; Auer, 2013; Acemoglu et al., 2014; Gorodnichenko and Roland, 2011, 2013).
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We use our new results to estimate the long-run e↵ect of institutions on economic performance.
We choose this application for several reasons. First, the estimation of the e↵ect of institutions
on economic development by Acemoglu et al. (2001) is likely the most prominent paper using
historical instruments for contemporary endogenous regressors and many important papers in the
institutions literature followed suit (e.g., Easterly and Levine, 2003; Rodrik et al., 2004; Acemoglu
and Johnson, 2005). Moreover, unlike many papers using this empirical technique, Acemoglu et al.
(2001) provide an explicit set of equations for interpreting their results and a discussion about the
role of past values of institutions. Our framework is consistent with their equations and discussion,
making our new results immediately applicable in this context. Finally, given the prominence of the
institutions literature, much e↵ort has gone into collecting measures of institutional characteristics
at di↵erent points in time. These data are essential in both steps of our empirical application.
Our analytic results demonstrate the importance of measuring persistence in the endogenous
variable when estimating long-run e↵ects. Before applying our augmented estimator, we first
estimate the persistence of institutional characteristics using panel data. Employing panel data
allows us to utilize large amounts of data and measure persistence with considerable statistical
power. This serves as a helpful complement and validation exercise for our augmented estimator,
which estimates persistence using cross-sectional data and IV. Panel data suggest that a change in
constraints on executive power in 1850 from the lowest observed score to the highest observed score
are associated with a change in current institutional quality by less than 1% of a standard deviation.
This indicates that large conventional IV regression coe cients may be due to low institutional
persistence rather than a high long-run causal e↵ect of institutions on economic growth.
We then apply our augmented estimator to measure the long-run e↵ect of institutions on eco-
nomic performance. In our preferred specification, a change in constraints on executive power in
1700 from the lowest to the highest possible score on the standard index leads to a 1.2 standard
deviation change in 1990 income per capita. While sizable, this e↵ect is less than half as large as
the coe cient generated by the conventional IV regressions, indicating that our updated estimator
is quantitatively important.
Our results have important implications for the field of long-run economic growth. First, we
provide an interpretation for IV regressions with historical instruments and contemporary endoge-
nous regressors. We then provide a new procedure that enables researchers to estimate the long-run
e↵ect of potential determinants of economic performance or other outcomes. Finally, using our new
analytic results and empirical technique, we generate estimates of the impact of institutions on
long-run economic growth (see, e.g., Acemoglu et al., 2005; Banerjee and Iyer, 2005; Dell, 2010;
Bruhn and Gallego, 2012). While our approach is applied to the e↵ect of institutions on eco-
nomic development, it is relevant for any empirical investigation using historical or geographical
instrumental variables with contemporary endogenous regressors.
In section 2, we present our framework and main analytic results. Section 3 presents our
empirical application, and section 4 concludes.
2
2 Analytic Results
Problems of omitted variables and reverse causality are severe in the growing literature on the fun-
damental determinants of long-run economic growth. As a result, historical or geographic variables
are often used as instruments for contemporary determinants of economic development in order to
overcome these issues and estimate causal e↵ects. The time lag between the instrument and the
endogenous variable, however, complicates the interpretation of the regression coe cient. Indeed,
specific interpretations are rarely attached to the coe cients from these regressions.
In section 2.1, we provide a general framework for interpreting instrumental variable regressions
when the instrument precedes the endogenous regressor in time. Our parameter of interest is the
‘long-run e↵ect’ of the endogenous variable, which we define as the causal e↵ect of historical values
of the endogenous variable on the contemporary dependent variable. This parameter tells us about
the long-run implications of a given policy or historical event, which are of fundamental importance
in this literature. We use our framework to derive the relationship between our parameter of interest
and the coe cient from a conventional IV regression. The di↵erent between the two is due to the
persistence in the endogenous variable, which we define as the causal e↵ect of historical levels of
the endogenous variable on its current level.
Our framework explicitly accounts for certain violations of the exclusion restriction that are
empirically relevant in the field of long-run growth. The inclusion of these violations does not
a↵ect our core results. Indeed, in the presence of these violations, the long-run e↵ect is the only
causal parameter that can be recovered from the regression. Thus, a key aspect of our study is
to demonstrate how to extract interesting economic parameters under violations of the exclusion
restriction.
Section 2.2 builds on the results from section 2.1 to demonstrate how to augment conventional
IV regressions to recover our parameter of interest. Our augmented estimator extracts the long-run
causal e↵ect of the endogenous variable by explicitly estimating the persistence of the endogenous
variable using observations at two intermediate points in time. Our method uses multiple equation
GMM with a single instrument.
2.1 Interpreting IV regressions in the long-run growth literature
Figure 1 provides a simple representation of our framework. We start by just considering the top
row of the figure (i.e. we ignore A). There are two periods, H for historical and C for contemporary,
while X is the endogeneous variable of interest and Y is the dependent variable. We assume that Z
would be a valid instrument for XH , but that XH is unobserved. This is a common data availability
constraint in the long-run growth literature. We are interested in examining the causal e↵ect of
XH on YC , which we refer to as the long-run e↵ect of X on Y .
At this point, we have described the basic data generating process usually underlying regressions
of this type. Without A, Z is a valid instrument for XC , and we can estimate the causal e↵ect of
XC on YC with a 2SLS regression. All of our key results will hold in this setting. However, we
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Figure 1: Causal diagram of equations (1)–(4) and the first stage in a conventional 2SLS regression.
Rectangular nodes represent observed variables and circular nodes represent unobserved variables.
The dotted line represent the first stage in a conventional 2SLS estimation.
think the top row of Figure 1 provides an incomplete picture of the underlying dynamics in most
cases. Our reasoning is all follows: if there are good reasons to expect that XC a↵ects YC , then
XH should also a↵ect YH . Then, if there is persistence in Y or if the mechanisms through which
XH a↵ects YH are persistent, then there will a causal a↵ect of XH on YC that is not intermediated
by XC . We represent this link using the variable A. At first, this appears to be a negative result,
because the existence A violates the usual exclusion restriction. It will not, however, inhibit our
ability to estimate our parameter of interest. Indeed, a key implication of including A is that our
parameter of interest becomes the only mechanism through which we can learn about the causal
e↵ect of X on Y . We focus on analyzing the case with A since it is more realistic, though we note
again that its inclusion does not a↵ect our main results.3 We model these alternate channels in a
simple reduced form manner, but a wide range of alternate specifications can be re-written in this
form.
To fix ideas, it is helpful to consider a particular example. Our system is a simple generalization
of the data generating process presented in Acemoglu et al. (2001). In their framework, Z would be
settler mortality, Y is income per capita and X is institutional quality. Compared to their formal
presentation of the underlying model, we add the existence of the A variable, which is consistent
with the empirical findings and interpretation presented in their paper.4 The A variable could be
3Appendix section A.1 analyzes the case without A.
4In particular, Acemoglu et al. (2001) find that historical institutions exert an impact on contemporary income
independently of contemporary institutions. Their interpretation of these results is in line with our equations: “In
some specifications, the overidentification tests using measures of early institutions reject at that 10-percent level
(but not at the 5-percent level). There are in fact good reasons to expect institutions circa 1900 to have a direct
e↵ect on income today (and hence the overidentifying tests to reject our restrictions): these institutions should a↵ect
physical and human capital investments at the beginning of the century, and have some e↵ect on current income
levels through this channel” (fn 31, p. 1393).
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physical or human capital, technology or culture, which would be a↵ected by historical institutions
and persist over time, eventually impacting contemporary income per capita.
Equations (1)–(4) represent the data generating process algebraically:
XH,i =  0,H +  Zi + "H,i (1)
XC,i =  0,C +  1XH,i + "C,i (2)
AC,i =  0 +  1XH,i + µi (3)
YC,i =  0 +  1XC,i +  2AC,i +  i. (4)
In standard settings, instrumental variables are used to estimate the contemporaneous causal e↵ect
of X, @YC@XC =  1. Our parameter of interest is the long-run causal e↵ect of X, ⌘ ⌘
@YC
@XH
. The other
key parameter in this set-up is @XC@XH =  1, which measures the persistence of historical changes in
X. If  1 > 1, then the endogenous variable diverges from its original path following a shock. If
 1 < 1, then converges back to its original path, and shocks eventually die out. We refer to  1 as a
a measure of ‘persistence.’
Some algebra shows that ⌘ = ( 1 1 +  2 1). The simple 2SLS regression of YC on XC with Z
as an instrument yields:
plim  ˆIV1 =  1 +
 2 1
 1
=
⌘
 1
. (5)
Thus, the resulting coe cient is consistent for the parameter of interest divided by the persistence
term,  1. This has an intuitive interpretation in that a one unit change in XC is associated with a
1
 1
unit change in XH . The 2SLS coe cient overestimates ⌘ when X converges to its original path
after a shock, i.e.  1 < 1, and underestimates the e↵ect when institutional quality diverges over
time following a shock, i.e.  1 > 1. The two are equal only in the knife-edge case where  1 = 1. We
refer to this condition as X being ‘perfectly persistent.’
In light of these results, it is apparent that a large 2SLS coe cient does not imply a large
long-run e↵ect of X on Y . The regression measures the long-term impact of improving XH enough
to raise XC by one unit. Thus, a large regressions coe cient may indicate an important impact of
XH or that the regression is picking up a very large change in XH . The algebra also indicates that,
in the presence of an A variable, it is not possible to recover the contemporaneous relationship
between institutions and income per capita,  1.5
These results suggest that we could recover ⌘ by multiplying the IV coe cient by  1 or by
including XH , rather than XC , in the regression. In most applications in long-run economic growth,
XH cannot be observed. Thus, we need to combine the cross-sectional regression with an estimate
of  1. In the next subsection, we demonstrate how to use GMM to estimate ⌘.
5As demonstrated in appendix section A.1, the relationship between the regression coe cient and ⌘ is unchanged
if the A variable is excluded from the system.
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2.2 Estimating ⌘
In this section, we demonstrate how to estimate ⌘ when XH is not observed. This is often the case
when using historical or geographic instruments. In order to estimate  1 without XH , we make use
of measures of X at intermediate points in time. Thus, our framework here extends that of the
previous section by allowing for more than two time periods:
Xt,i =  0,t +  1Xt 1 + ✏t,i, 8 t = 1 . . . C, t 6= H (6)
XH,i =  0,H +  1XH 1,i +  Zi + ✏H,i (7)
AC,i =  0 +  1XH,i + µi, (8)
YC,i =  0 +  1XC,i +  2AC +  i. (9)
Now, X follows a simple law of motion given by (6). Then, in some year H, X is shocked by Z.
After the shock, X continues to follow the original law of motion. Our key assumption is that  1
is constant over time. This allows us to infer the relationship between XC and XH even when the
latter is not observable.6
We start by solving for the relationship between values of XT and XT Q. This will be important
because we will use the relationship between XT and XT Q to estimate @XC@XH . To do so, we simply
apply (6) recursively:
XT,i =  0,T +  1XT 1,i + ✏T,i (10)
=
 Q 1X
k=0
 k1 0,T k
 
+  Q1 XT Q,i +
 Q 1X
k=0
 k1✏T k,i
 
. (11)
Now consider the IV regression:
XT,i = a0 + a1XT Q,i + a2,i, (12)
where i denotes a country and Zi is an instrument for XT Q,i. There is no violation of the exclusion
restriction in this case and, according to (11), the estimation yields:
plim aˆ1 =  
Q
1 . (13)
Now we turn to the relationship between X and Y . A little algebra yields:
YC,i =  ˜0 + ( 1 
C H
1 +  2 1)XH,i + ✏˜i, (14)
6This result can be generalized to any known functional form for the evolution of  1.
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where  ˜0 =  0,C +
 
 1
PC H 1
k=0  
k
1 0,T k
 
+  2 0 and ✏˜i =
 
 1
PQ 1
k=0  
k
1✏X,T k
 
+  C,i +  2µi. It is
immediate that ⌘H ⌘ @YC@XH = ( 1 C H1 +  2 1). Now, consider the conventional IV regression:
YC,i = b0 + b1XC,i + b2,i, (15)
where i denotes a country and Zi is an instrument for XC . Similar to our results from section 2,
this regression yields:
plim bˆ1 =
 1 
C H
1 +  2 1
 C H1
=
⌘H
 C H1
. (16)
To solve for ⌘H , we simply combine the results from estimating equations (12) and (15) :
aˆ1 =  
Q
1 ) (17)
 1 = aˆ
1
Q
1 (18)
and
bˆ1 =
⌘H
 C H1
) (19)
⌘H = bˆ1 ⇤  C H1 (20)
= bˆ1 ⇤ aˆ
C H
Q
1 . (21)
Our new estimator is given by equation (21). To construct confidence intervals around our estimates
of ⌘H , we estimate equations (12) and (15) jointly via GMM and apply the delta method to generate
point estimates and standard errors for the nonlinear transformation yielding the expression for ⌘H
in equation (21).
3 Application: Institutions and Long-Run Growth
In section 2.1, we provided a simple, but general, framework for interpreting IV regression coef-
ficients with historical instruments and contemporary endogenous regressors. We found that the
regression coe cient is equal to the long-run impact of changing historical conditions multiplied by
the persistence of the endogenous variable. This is true even under certain violations of the exclu-
sion restriction. In section 2.2, we provided an augmented estimator that uses multiple equation
GMM to estimate the long-run impact of changing historical conditions.
In this section, we apply our findings to estimate the long-run impact of improving institutional
quality. We do so using two di↵erent approaches. First, we estimate the persistence of institutions in
panel data. Our analytic results from section 2.1 demonstrate that these estimates give us the bias in
the standard regression coe cient when trying to estimate our parameter of interest. The panel data
results suggest very low persistence in institutions, indicating the regression coe cients overestimate
the long-run impact of changing institutions. We then apply our new estimator to directly estimate
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the long-run impact of improving institutions using the settler mortality instrument from Acemoglu
et al. (2001). Compared to our panel data estimates, we find a much larger e↵ect of changing
historical institutions with this approach. In our preferred specification, increasing institutional
quality – as measured by the standard ‘constraints on the executive’ index – in 1700 from the
lowest to highest possible value of institutional quality increases 1990 income per capita by 1.2
standard deviations. While sizable, this result is significantly lower than the coe cient from the
un-augmented regression, indicating that our updated approach is quantitatively important.
3.1 Data
Our main measure of institutional quality, ‘Constraints on the Executive,’ comes from the Polity
IV dataset, which is standard in the literature. We use this measure in both the panel and GMM
pieces of our application. Constraints on the Executive measures the limits to executive power
and is measured on a 7 point scale that increases in the level of constraints. This is the preferred
measure of institutional quality identified in the IV literature (Glaeser et al., 2004; Acemoglu et al.,
2005).7 We use this measure in both the panel and GMM applications. A major advantage of this
dataset is the length of the time series. In particular, for a set of 25 countries, we have institutional
data from 1000–2013. The cross section increases to 125 countries in later years. To supplement
the panel data analysis, we also use the Political Rights Index (PRI) from Freedom House and
the Vanhanen Index of Democratization, which measures democracy in independent countries from
1810-1998 (Vanhanen, 2000).
Following recommendations by Albouy (2012) and Acemoglu et al. (2012), we use the log of
potential settler mortality capped at 250 per 1000 as the instrument in the GMM regressions.8
Unfortunately, it is not clear exactly when settler mortality should first a↵ect institutions. We
use 1700. Since these are cross-sectional estimates, we cannot include country fixed-e↵ects. As a
result, we may have a violation of the exclusion restriction if settler mortality is correlated with
other country-specific factors such as disease environment or geography. To mitigate these concerns,
we include controls for the log of the absolute value of latitude and World Bank region fixed e↵ects.9
The measure of economic development is the natural logarithm of the gross domestic product per
capita in 1990, again from Acemoglu et al. (2001). Summary statistics are provided in table 5.
7In the appendix, we also use the ‘Democracy’ and ‘Autocracy’ measures. Democracy captures constraints on
the executive and the ability of citizens to express preferences about leaders. It is measured on an 11 point scale.
Autocracy captures constraints on the executive and several measures of openness of political participation. It is also
measured on an 11 point scale.
8The uncapped settler mortality variable is obtained directly from AJR (2001).
9The latitude variable is the latitude of a country’s approximate geodesic centroid obtained from CIA’s World
Factbook. The regional dummies indicate the Sub-Saharan Africa, Middle East & North Africa, South Asia, East
Asia and Pacific, and the North America regions, as defined by the World Bank. There are no observations from the
Europe & Central Asia region and the Latin America & Caribbean region is the background region.
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3.2 Measuring Institutional Persistence in Panel Data
Before applying our new estimator, we measure the persistence of institutions in panel data. Our
analytic results from section 2.1 demonstrate how to combine these estimates with the usual IV
regression to extract an estimate of the long-run impact of improving institutional quality. This
analysis complements the application of our new estimator by allowing us to estimate the persistence
of institutions with much greater precision.
To measure the persistence of institutions, we employ the time-series of analog of equation (2):
INSTc,t = ↵c + ⌫t +  1INSTc,t 1 + ✏c,t, (22)
where INST is a measure of institutional quality, ⌫t is a time fixed e↵ect, and ↵c is a country fixed-
e↵ect. As demonstrated in section 2.1, the relevant measure of institutional persistence is  1. This
simple specification is consistent with the growing literature that examines the determinants of
institutional quality (e.g., Acemoglu et al, 2008, 2009). We use the three main measures of institu-
tions discussed in the previous section. In the appendix, we show that the results are unchanged if
we use the components of the Vanhanen Index of Democracy or the Democracy/Autocracy variables
from Polity IV. In each specification, we report the p-value of the simple t-test for  1 = 1.10
We do not include any country-specific time-varying control variables for two reasons. First,
we are interested in the persistence of institutions through any intervening channel. For example,
if institutions increase income and higher income leads to better institutions in the next period,
then we want to capture this e↵ect in our measure of persistence.11 Of course, not controlling for
other factors may create a problem of omitted variables. Omitted variables, however, are likely
to a↵ect past and current institutions in the same direction, biasing our estimate of  1 upward.
Without a more complete theory of institutional persistence, it is not possible to decide a priori
which variables are channels of institutional persistence and which are omitted variables. Moreover,
as discussed below, the existing literature estimates related panel regressions with control variables
and always finds that  1 < 1.
For our main analysis, we use the data at 10 year intervals and run regressions on the entire
unbalanced sample. We take single observations instead of aggregating across years to follow the
existing literature (Acemoglu et al., 2008, 2009). We use the Arellano-Bong GMM estimator to
correct for Nickell bias and show that the results hold in the Vanhanen Index of Democracy to
mitigate concerns about censoring in the more common measures of institutions (Benhabib et al.,
2013). In the appendix, we demonstrate that our qualitative findings hold across across a number
of alternate scenarios. Specifically, we use data in 1, 5, 30, and 100 year intervals and restrict
the sample to former colonies and the sample of the 25 countries for which we have data from
1800-2013.
10We also report the results of the Phillips-Perron unit root test which is testing the null hypothesis that a variable
is perfectly persistent, i.e., that it has a unit root. This unit root test is robust to general forms of heteroskedasticity
in the error term, and does not require a specified lag length for the test regression.
11This result is shown formally in section A.3 of the appendix.
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Table 1: Institutional Persistence — 10-Year Data
Constraint on
Executive
Freedom House
Measure of Democracy
Vanhanen Index
of Democracy
OLS OLS GMM OLS OLS GMM OLS OLS GMM
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
First Lag of Constraint on
the Executive
0.596⇤⇤⇤ 0.454⇤⇤⇤ 0.344⇤⇤⇤
(0.048) (0.052) (0.070)
First Lag of Freedom House
Measure of Democracy
0.162⇤ 0.144 0.297
(0.088) (0.088) (0.201)
First Lag of Vanhanen Index
of Democratization
0.807⇤⇤⇤ 0.563⇤⇤⇤ 0.459⇤⇤⇤
(0.038) (0.056) (0.107)
Year FE No Yes Yes No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Number of Observations 1,258 1,258 1,057 337 337 138 1,113 1,113 958
Number of Countries 157 157 137 142 142 138 144 144 139
Adjusted R2 0.333 0.437 0.026 0.083 0.557 0.653
Signif. of main coe↵.=1 test .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00
Signif. of unit root test (P-P) .00 .00 .00
This table establishes that the degree of persistence of institutions is below one, accounting for year fixed e↵ects. The estimation is
performed with both OLS as well as the GMM estimator by Arellano and Bond (1991) where institutions are instrumented using a
double lag. Robust standard errors are shown in the parentheses. *** Significant at the 1 percent level. ** Significant at the 5 percent
level. * Significant at the 10 percent level.
Table 1 presents our baseline persistence results. In all cases, the coe cient is significantly less
than 1 at the 1% level. To quantify these e↵ects in terms relevant for long-run economic growth, we
derive @XC@XH from the panel regressions. Our analytic results from section 2.1 demonstrate that this
will be bias from an IV regression of current income on current institutions. It is easiest to interpret
the Vanhanen index because it does not have an upper bound. In 1850, the first year in the data,
the range in the Vanhanen index was 7.38. With our estimates of  1, we can calculate the long-run
impact on current institutions of positive shock that improved a country’s 1850 institutions from
0 to 7.38 on the Vanhanen scale. Let j denote the country without the shock and j’ denote the
country with the shock. We take 2000 as current data because that is the most recent year available
in the Vanhanen dataset. Using the results from column (8) – which account for year fixed e↵ects,
and are more conservative than the corresponding GMM estimate in column (9), we get:
INSTj0,2000   INSTj,2000 = 7.38 ⇤ .563 2000 185010 = 7.38 ⇤ .56315 = .001. (23)
Thus, this shock only raises institutions by .001 on the Vanhanen scale in the long run, and
@XC
@XH
= .001/7.38 is the bias in an IV regression. For comparison, the standard deviation in the
Vanhanen scale for 2000 is 12.18.
We can perform the same analysis for ‘constraints on the executive’. The maximum di↵erence
in this measure is 6. Using the same logic and the results from column 2, we get:
INSTj0,2013   INSTj,2013 = 6 ⇤ .454 2013 185010 = 6 ⇤ .45416.3 = 1.53x10 5. (24)
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The standard deviation for constraints on the executive in 2013 is 1.95. Thus, the data suggest that
improving institutions in 1850 has a very small e↵ect on institutions today, and that IV regression
will substantially overestimate long-run causal e↵ects.
Appendix tables A.1 – A.4 present the results at 1, 5, 10, 100 year intervals. In our GMM
application, we will focus on the sub-sample of former colonies in order to use settler mortality as
an instrument for institutional quality. Thus, appendix tables A.7 – A.10 in the appendix present
results for this subsample. Tables A.11 – A.14 in the appendix presents our results using the
balanced panel from 1800-2013. We only have data on 25 countries in this setting. The results are
qualitatively unchanged in all of these scenarios.
We also examine whether institutional persistence in constant over time by running rolling
regressions (Figures 5 and 6) for the two of the main dependent variables of interest that are
available for more than 50 years, (i.e., Constraint on the Executive and the Vanhanen Index of
Democracy). We run the 10-year regressions on 50-year rolling sample windows. In particular,
we run a regression starting in each year between 1850 and 1963 and plot the estimate and its 95
percent confidence interval against the initial year of the rolling window. The coe cient on lagged
institutions appears relatively stable in each case. Moreover, the 95% confidence interval almost
always excludes 1, confirming the robustness of the finding that the persistence of these measures of
institutions is below 1. Tables A.15 – A.18 provide evidence of a structural break in the persistence
of institutions in 1965. We account for this in our GMM application.
Though our results show surprisingly little institutional persistence, they are consistent with
the existing literature. As described above, we do not include any control variables because we
want to capture the full degree of persistence in institutions. A growing literature, however, looks
at the determinants of institutions, mostly focusing on whether increase in income can lead to more
democracy (the ‘Modernization Hypothesis’). While it is not the goal of these papers to measure
institutional persistence, the lag of institutions is always included as a control. In every case we
have found in the literature, the coe cient is significantly less than one (Acemoglu et al., 2008,
2009; Heid et al., 2012; Benhabib et al., 2013; Cervellati et al., 2014).
3.3 Direct Estimation of ⌘
In this section, we apply our new estimator from 2.2 to measure the long-run e↵ect of institutions
on economic development. To do so, we simultaneously estimate two equations via GMM. First, we
estimate the cross-sectional relationship between contemporary institutions and contemporary in-
come per capita via equation (12). Second, we estimate the persistence of institutions via equation
(15). Then, we combine the results of these equations to extract the long-run e↵ect of improving
institutions using equation (21). Both equations are estimated using settler mortality as an instru-
ment, following Acemoglu et al. (2001). Several studies have suggested that settler mortality is
correlated with other contemporary variables, such as education or trade (e.g., Dollar and Kraay,
2003; Glaeser et al., 2004). For our results to be valid, we need only assume that settler mortality
11
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Figure 2: This figure depicts the coe cient from panel regressions of Constraint on the Executive
on its 10-year lagged value in over period 1850–2013 with a 50-year regression window and a step
size of 1 years, estimated with OLS. The regressions account for year fixed e↵ects. Robust standard
errors are used for the calculation of the confidence band.
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Figure 3: This figure depicts the coe cient from panel regressions of the Vanhanen Index of Democ-
racy on its 10-year lagged value in over period 1810–2013 with a 50-year regression window and
a step size of 1 years, estimated with OLS. The regressions account for year fixed e↵ects. Robust
standard errors are used for the calculation of the confidence band.
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Table 2: Summary Statistics
Average P25 P50 P75 S.D.
Log GDP per capita in 1990s 8.11 7.29 8.21 8.82 1.06
Constraint on Executive in 1990s 4.52 2.95 4.45 6.30 1.90
Constraint on Executive in 1960s 3.78 2.37 3.15 5.24 2.06
Constraint on Executive in 1900 2.30 1 1 3 2.17
Log Capped European Settler Mortality 4.47 4.24 4.36 5.50 0.94
Log Absolute Latitude 2.39 2.08 2.61 3.07 1.00
Observations 56
a↵ected these other variables through historical institutions. Using the notation from section 2.1,
education or trade could serve as the A variable in our framework.
The second of our two regressions will give us a new estimate of institutional persistence.
Compared with the estimates from panel data, the use of instrumental variables also allows us
to correct for issues of measurement error and omitted variables. The trade-o↵ is that we have
many fewer observations, which severely limits our statistical power, and we cannot control for all
geographic covariates via fixed e↵ects.12
Columns 1, 4, and 7 present results from estimating equation (15) with di↵erent sets of geo-
graphic controls. For each of these income regressions, we provide two separate estimates of  1 via
equation (12). In columns 2, 5, and 8, we use the estimated persistence of institutions between
1900 and 1960. In the remaining columns, we use the persistence of institutions between 1900
and 1990.13 Panel 1 presents the regression results. Panel 2 presents the implied estimates of ⌘
assuming that settler mortality first a↵ects institutions in 1700. It also presents tests of the null
hypothesis that  1 < 1.
Columns 1-3 present results without using any controls. The first stage F-statistics indicate that
we have strong instruments in all regressions. The point estimates in column 2 and 3 once again
indicate that  1 < 1, though we do not have enough statistical power to reject the null hypothesis
of  1 = 1 at conventional levels. Given that this result is consistent with panel data, where we
have considerably more power, we take this as further evidence for our earlier findings. The point
estimates here indicate higher persistence than those found in section 3.2.14
12In Section A.3 of the appendix, we demonstrate how using IV allows us to separate channels through which
institutions might persist from omitted variables that are correlated with both past and future institutions. In
Section A.2 of the appendix, we also discuss the degree to which historical IV’s ‘correct for’ reverse causality.
13Appendix tables A.15 – A.18 present evidence of a structural break in the persistence of institutions in 1965.
14Given the small number of observations and low statistical power, it is possible to construct specifications with
 1 > 1, especially when including many covariates. In parsimonious specifications and those including World Bank
region fixed e↵ects, we consistently find  1 < 1. Given the evidence presented in section 3.2, our interpretation is
that the data strongly suggest that  1 < 1.
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Table 3: Estimating the long-run e↵ect of Institutions
Log GDP
per cap. in
Constraint on
Executive in
Log GDP
per cap. in
Constraint on
Executive in
Log GDP
per cap. in
Constraint on
Executive in
1990s 1960s 1990s 1990s 1960s 1990s 1990s 1960s 1990s
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Panel 1: Conventional Estimates and Estimates of the Degree of Persistence
Constraint on Executive in 1990s 0.712⇤⇤⇤ 0.508⇤⇤ 0.639⇤⇤⇤
(0.169) (0.199) (0.197)
Constraint on Executive in 1900 0.835⇤⇤⇤ 0.761⇤⇤⇤ 0.720⇤ 0.545⇤ 0.791 0.500⇤
(0.216) (0.170) (0.432) (0.301) (0.483) (0.285)
Log Absolute Latitude -0.477⇤⇤ -0.469 0.301
(0.214) (0.295) (0.185)
Region FE No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of Observations 56 56 56 56 56 56 56 56 56
Wald Test of  ˆ0 = 1 p-value .444 .159 .518 .13 .665 .079
AR Test of  ˆ0 = 1 p-value 0.497 0.274 0.577 0.238 0.696 0.213
First Stage F -Statistic (K-P) 27.064 26.217 26.217 5.292 12.522 12.522 5.349 11.152 11.152
Panel 2: Estimates of ⌘1700
Based on institutional
persistence 1900–1960s
.313 .114 .220
(.387) (.334) (.643)
Based on institutional
persistence 1900–1990s
.305 .077 .074
(.196) (.136) (.135)
This table presents estimates of the e↵ect of institutions on economic development. The first panel presents estimates from conventional
2SLS analyses, accounting for the natural logarithm of absolute latitude and world region fixed e↵ects. Furthermore, the panel presents
estimates of the degree of persistence of institutions from 1900 to the 1960s as well as from 1900 to the 1990s. The second panel presents
estimates based on the augmented estimator, based on GMM estimation, that accounts for the degree of persistence of institutions,
accounting for the natural logarithm of absolute latitude and world region fixed e↵ects. Robust standard errors are shown in the
parentheses. *** Significant at the 1 percent level. ** Significant at the 5 percent level. * Significant at the 10 percent level.
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Comparing the estimates of ⌘1700 in column 1 to the the regression coe cient indicates that
accounting for persistence can have a meaningful impact on the estimate of the long-run e↵ect of
institutions. Using the more conservative estimates from column 2, increasing institutional quality
from 1 (the worst possible value) to 7 (this highest possible value) in 1700 leads to a 1.88 log point
change in 1900 income per capita, which is 1.7 standard deviations. The long-run e↵ect decreases
if we use estimates of persistence from column 3.
As discussed above, settler mortality may correlated with many other geographic factors that
a↵ect income per capita, creating a violation of the exclusion restriction. Thus, the remainder of
the table adds latitude and World Bank region fixed e↵ects to the analysis. These are the most
important geographic covariates of development in the literature.15 The qualitative results are
similar in all specifications. Columns 7-9 include both controls. In this specification, changing
institutions in 1700 from a 1 to a 7 leads to a 1.2 standard deviation change in 1990 income per
capita, which is less than half as large as the e↵ect implied by the regression coe cient in column
7. We consider this to be a moderate long-run e↵ect of improving institutional quality.
Appendix table 5 demonstrates that the main results are robust to controlling for temperature
and soil quality, which may be correlated with settler mortality rates and directly a↵ect income
per capita. Both are insignificant. Appendix table 6 demonstrates that the results are robust to
adding the two most prominent ‘endogenous controls’ in the long-run growth literature, population
density in 1500 and the timing of the neolithic transition.
Overall, these results indicate that accounting for institutional persistence is quantitatively im-
portant. Unfortunately, the small sample for which we have a good instrument limits the statistical
power. In particular, while the point estimates for institutional persistence are below one (over
long time periods), we cannot statistically reject that they are less than one. Also, the confidence
intervals for ⌘ are large. Still, we believe that this exercise, especially in conjunction with the
results from section 3.2, provides evidence that estimates of the long-run impact of improving in-
stitutions need to account for institutional persistence. When doing so, we find relatively moderate
long-run e↵ects of improving institutions. More generally, this new methodology is useful to long-
run growth literature by allowing researchers to estimate the long-run impact of improving any
potential determinant of income per capita.
4 Conclusion
A growing literature convincingly argues that historical events continue to shape current levels of
economic development (Spolaore and Wacziarg, 2013; Nunn, 2014). Currently, however, we do not
know how to translate these interesting findings into policy advice that is relevant for developing
countries. We take a step in this direction by analyzing a popular methodology, IV regressions where
the instrument precedes the endogenous regressor in time, and investigating the interpretation of
15Acemoglu et al. (2001) use latitude and continent fixed e↵ects as baseline controls. We use World Bank region
fixed e↵ects, which are more appropriate for a modern context and yield stronger first stage F-statistics (Ashraf and
Galor, 2013).
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the regression coe cients. We then provide an augmented estimator that estimates the long-
run e↵ect of changes in historical conditions. Finally, we apply our results to the literature on
institutions and economic development. Using panel data, we find a relatively small persistence
in institutions, indicating that conventional IV regressions overestimate the long-run impact of
changes in institutions. When adjusting for low persistence using our augmented estimator, we
find a more moderate e↵ect of institutions on economic outcomes. Our procedure is relevant for a
broad range of contexts.
A Further Algebraic Implications
A.1 No Alternative Channels
In this section, we examine the interpretation of the standard IV regression without the presence
of an A variable. This is a special case of our more general framework. The simplified system is
given by:
XH,i =  0 +  Zi + "H,i (25)
XC,i =  0 +  1XC,i + "C,i (26)
YC,i =  0 +  1XC,i +  i. (27)
In this set-up, ⌘ = @YC@XH =  1 1. Since there is no violation of the exclusion restriction, the 2SLS
regression yields:
plim  ˆIV1 =  1. (28)
Thus, as in the more general framework, ⌘ =  1 · plim  ˆIV1 . So, our results for estimating ⌘ hold in
this more simple case. A key aspect of our paper is that this simple result still hold under violations
of the exclusion restriction that take the form we study in section 2. We believe that this is the
empirically relevant case when investigating causes of long-run economic growth.
A.2 Reverse Causality and Historical Instruments
In this section, we discuss the ability of historical instruments to ‘overcome’ reverse causality. Our
paramter of interest, ⌘, actually incorporates reverse causality. To see this, we can add reverse
causality to the framework of Section 2.
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XH,i =  0 +  Zi + "H,i (29)
YH,i =  0,H +  1XH,i +  H,i (30)
XC =  0,C +  1XH,i + 'Yv + "C,i (31)
AC,i =  0 +  1XH,i + µi (32)
YC,i =  0 +  1XC,i +  2AC,i +  C,i (33)
Now, ⌘R =
@YC
XH
= ( 1 1 +  2 1 +  21'). Again, the 2SLS coe cient yields:
plim  ˆIV1 =
⌘R
 1 +  1'
. (34)
where @XC@XH =  1+ 1'. It is apparent that the reverse causality coe cient enters the ⌘R coe cient.
This doesn’t change the fact that a 1 unit change in X0 will increase Y1 by ⌘R, but it is necessary
to keep in mind the limited ability of the 2SLS coe cient to ‘isolate’ the e↵ect of one variable on
another even if historical data on X in employed.
A.3 Channels versus Omitted Variables
We now consider what the 2SLS regression accomplishes when compared to OLS. So far, we haven’t
introduced any explicit violations of the exclusion restriction other than causal channels, represented
by A. Consider the e↵ect of a variable, for example some geographic characteristic, that is correlated
with XH , but is not causally a↵ected by XH .
XH,i =  0 +  Zi + "H,i (35)
AH,i =  0,H + µH,i (36)
YH,i =  0 +  1XH,i +  2AH +  H,i (37)
XC,i =  0 +  1XH,i + "X,C (38)
AC,i =  0,C +  1XH,i + µC,i (39)
YC,i =  0 +  1XC,i +  2AC,i +  3Wi +  C,i (40)
where Cov(W,X0) = ⌫ 6= 0 but Cov(W,Z) = 0. We also define Var(X0) = ⇠. In this case, the OLS
coe cient picks up the association between W and XH in the usual omitted variable fashion, but
2SLS does not:
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plim  ˆOLS1 =  1 +
 1 2
 1
+
 3⌫
 1⇠
=
⌘
 1
+
 3⌫
 1⇠
(41)
plim  ˆIV1 =  1 +
 2 1
 1
=
⌘
 1
(42)
Indeed, the 2SLS coe cient is the same as in Section 2.2. So, the 2SLS coe cient removes the
e↵ect of correlates of XH but not channels through which XH a↵ects YC .
Finally, we demonstrate that if X0 a↵ects X1 through an alternative channel, in this case A1,
we do not want to control for this channel when measuring  1. Consider the following extensions
of the results from section 2:
XH,i =  0,H +  Zi + "H,i (43)
AC,i =  0,H +  1XH,i + µC,i (44)
XC,i =  0,C +  1XH ++⇠AC + "X,C (45)
YC,i =  0 +  1XC,i +  2AC,i +  C,i (46)
Plugging (44) into (45) yields:
XC,i = ( 0,C + ⇠ 0) + (⇠ 1 +  1)XH,i + (⇠"C,i + µC). (47)
Now, defining  ˜1 = (⇠ 1 +  1), we have the exact same system as section 2, except that  ˜1 is the
persistence of institutions. Thus, we want to measure this ‘total’ (through all channels) persistence,
⇠, not just the partial persistence  1.
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Figure A.1: This figure depicts the average level of Democracy plotted against time for countries
with available data for the 150-year period.
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Figure A.2: This figure depicts the average level of Autocracy plotted against time for countries
with available data for the 150-year period.
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Figure A.3: This figure depicts the average level of the Vanhanen Index of Competition plotted
against time for countries with available data for the 150-year period.
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Figure A.4: This figure depicts the average level of Democracy plotted against time for for colonized
countries with available data for the 150-year period.
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Figure A.5: This figure depicts the average level of Autocracy plotted against time for colonized
countries with available data for the 150-year period.
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Figure A.6: This figure depicts the average level of the Vanhanen Index of Competition plotted
against time for colonized countries with available data for the 150-year period.
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Figure A.7: This figure depicts the average level of Constraint on the Executive plotted against
time for colonized countries with available data for the 150-year period.
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Figure A.8: This figure depicts the average level of the Freedom House PRI plotted against time
for colonized countries with available data for the 30-year period.
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Figure A.9: This figure depicts the average level of the Vanhanen Index plotted against time for
colonized countries with available data for the 150-year period.
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Figure A.10: This figure depicts the coe cient from panel regressions of Democracy on its 10-year
lagged value in over period 1850–2013 with a 50-year regression window and a step size of 1 years,
estimated with OLS. The regressions account for year fixed e↵ects. Robust standard errors are
used for the calculation of the confidence band.
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Figure A.11: This figure depicts the coe cient from panel regressions of Autocracy on its 10-year
lagged value in over period 1850–2013 with a 50-year regression window and a step size of 1 years,
estimated with OLS. The regressions account for year fixed e↵ects. Robust standard errors are
used for the calculation of the confidence band.
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Figure A.12: This figure depicts the coe cient from panel regressions of the Vanhanen Index of
Competition on its 10-year lagged value in over period 1850–2013 with a 50-year regression window
and a step size of 1 years, estimated with OLS. The regressions account for year fixed e↵ects.
Robust standard errors are used for the calculation of the confidence band.
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Figure A.13: Colonies only. This figure depicts the coe cient from panel regressions of Democracy
on its 10-year lagged value in over period 1850–2013 with a 50-year regression window and a step
size of 1 years, estimated with OLS. The regressions account for year fixed e↵ects. Robust standard
errors are used for the calculation of the confidence band.
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Figure A.14: Colonies only. This figure depicts the coe cient from panel regressions of Autocracy
on its 10-year lagged value in over period 1850–2013 with a 50-year regression window and a step
size of 1 years, estimated with OLS. The regressions account for year fixed e↵ects. Robust standard
errors are used for the calculation of the confidence band.
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Figure A.15: Colonies only. This figure depicts the coe cient from panel regressions of the Van-
hanen Index of Competition on its 10-year lagged value in over period 1850–2013 with a 50-year
regression window and a step size of 1 years, estimated with OLS. The regressions account for year
fixed e↵ects. Robust standard errors are used for the calculation of the confidence band.
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Figure A.16: Colonies only. This figure depicts the coe cient from panel regressions of Constraint
on the Executive on its 10-year lagged value in over period 1850–2013 with a 50-year regression
window and a step size of 1 years, estimated with OLS. The regressions account for year fixed
e↵ects. Robust standard errors are used for the calculation of the confidence band.
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Figure A.17: Colonies only. This figure depicts the coe cient from panel regressions of the Van-
hanen Index of Democracy on its 10-year lagged value in over period 1850–2013 with a 50-year
regression window and a step size of 1 years, estimated with OLS. The regressions account for year
fixed e↵ects. Robust standard errors are used for the calculation of the confidence band.
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Table A.1: Institutional Persistence — 1-Year Data
Constraint on
Executive
Freedom House
Measure of Democracy
Vanhanen Index
of Democracy
OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
First Lag of Constraint on
the Executive
0.957⇤⇤⇤ 0.936⇤⇤⇤
(0.005) (0.007)
First Lag of Freedom House
Measure of Democracy
0.836⇤⇤⇤ 0.821⇤⇤⇤
(0.016) (0.016)
First Lag of Vanhanen Index
of Democratization
0.961⇤⇤⇤ 0.919⇤⇤⇤
(0.007) (0.011)
Year FE No Yes No Yes No Yes
Number of Observations 14,117 14,117 4,245 4,245 12,012 12,012
Number of Countries 158 158 166 166 163 163
Adjusted R2 0.912 0.913 0.705 0.710 0.912 0.915
Signif. of main coe↵.=1 test .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00
Signif. of unit root test (P-P) .01 .00 .00
This table establishes that the degree of persistence of institutions is below one, accounting for year fixed
e↵ects. The estimation is performed with both OLS as well as the GMM estimator by Arellano and Bond
(1991) where institutions are instrumented using a double lag. Robust standard errors are shown in the
parentheses. *** Significant at the 1 percent level. ** Significant at the 5 percent level. * Significant at
the 10 percent level.
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Table A.2: Institutional Persistence — 5-Year Data
Constraint on
Executive
Freedom House
Measure of Democracy
Vanhanen Index
of Democracy
OLS OLS GMM OLS OLS GMM OLS OLS GMM
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
First Lag of Constraint on
the Executive
0.779⇤⇤⇤ 0.694⇤⇤⇤ 0.509⇤⇤⇤
(0.027) (0.033) (0.044)
First Lag of Freedom House
Measure of Democracy
0.492⇤⇤⇤ 0.481⇤⇤⇤ 0.428⇤⇤⇤
(0.049) (0.052) (0.107)
First Lag of Vanhanen Index
of Democratization
0.871⇤⇤⇤ 0.714⇤⇤⇤ 0.632⇤⇤⇤
(0.024) (0.036) (0.045)
Year FE No Yes Yes No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Number of Observations 2,625 2,625 2,388 936 936 670 2,324 2,324 2,145
Number of Countries 158 158 158 166 166 142 162 162 144
Adjusted R2 0.585 0.619 0.255 0.268 0.694 0.733
Signif. of main coe↵.=1 test .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00
Signif. of unit root test (P-P) .14 .00 .00
This table establishes that the degree of persistence of institutions is below one, accounting for year fixed e↵ects. The estimation is
performed with both OLS as well as the GMM estimator by Arellano and Bond (1991) where institutions are instrumented using a
double lag. Robust standard errors are shown in the parentheses. *** Significant at the 1 percent level. ** Significant at the 5 percent
level. * Significant at the 10 percent level.39
Table A.3: Institutional Persistence — 30-Year Data
Constraint on
Executive
Vanhanen Index
of Democracy
OLS OLS GMM OLS OLS GMM
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
First Lag of Constraint on
the Executive
0.223⇤⇤⇤ 0.063 0.443⇤⇤⇤
(0.077) (0.072) (0.162)
First Lag of Vanhanen Index
of Democratization
0.818⇤⇤⇤ 0.605⇤⇤⇤ 0.406⇤
(0.089) (0.109) (0.223)
Year FE No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Number of Observations 374 374 236 232 232 160
Number of Countries 131 131 73 71 71 54
Adjusted R2 0.042 0.354 0.410 0.521
Signif. of main coe↵.=1 test .00 .00 .00 .04 .00 .010
Signif. of unit root test (P-P) .25 .90
This table establishes that the degree of persistence of institutions is below one, accounting for year fixed
e↵ects. The estimation is performed with both OLS as well as the GMM estimator by Arellano and Bond
(1991) where institutions are instrumented using a double lag. Robust standard errors are shown in the
parentheses. *** Significant at the 1 percent level. ** Significant at the 5 percent level. * Significant at
the 10 percent level.
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Table A.4: Institutional Persistence — 100-Year Data
Constraint on Executive
(1) (2) (3)
OLS OLS GMM
First Lag of Constraint on
the Executive (AJR 2005)
0.712⇤⇤⇤ 0.679⇤⇤⇤ 0.622⇤⇤
(0.144) (0.142) (0.304)
Year FE No Yes Yes
Number of Observations 200 200 175
Number of Countries 25 25 25
Adjusted R2 .311 .339
Signif. of unit root test 1
Signif. of main coe↵.=1 test .06 .033 .21
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Table A.5: Robustness to Accounting for Temperatures and Soil Productivity
Log GDP
per cap. in
Constraint on
Executive in
Log GDP
per cap. in
Constraint on
Executive in
1990s 1960s 1990s 1990s 1960s 1990s
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Constraint on Executive in 1990s 0.736⇤⇤ 0.628⇤⇤⇤
(0.295) (0.191)
Constraint on Executive in 1900 0.992 0.486 0.867⇤ 0.531⇤
(0.708) (0.354) (0.508) (0.289)
Log Absolute Latitude -0.468⇤⇤ -0.486⇤ 0.246 -0.473⇤⇤ -0.512 0.342⇤
(0.220) (0.273) (0.171) (0.230) (0.345) (0.202)
Temperature 0.041 0.088 -0.032
(0.049) (0.130) (0.071)
Soil Fertility 0.135 -0.745 -1.584
(0.694) (2.473) (1.018)
Region FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of Observations 55 55 55 55 55 55
Wald Test of  ˆ0 = 1 p-value .991 .146 .793 .105
AR Test of  ˆ0 = 1 p-value 0.991 0.335 0.806 0.247
First Stage F -Statistic (K-P) 3.386 5.724 5.724 6.222 10.016 10.016
This table presents estimates of the e↵ect of institutions on economic development. The first panel presents
estimates from conventional 2SLS analyses, accounting for the natural logarithm of absolute latitude and
world region fixed e↵ects. Furthermore, the panel presents estimates of the degree of persistence of insti-
tutions from 1900 to the 1960s as well as from 1900 to the 1990s. The second panel presents estimates
based on the augmented estimator, based on GMM estimation, that accounts for the degree of persistence of
institutions, accounting for the natural logarithm of absolute latitude and world region fixed e↵ects. Robust
standard errors are shown in the parentheses. *** Significant at the 1 percent level. ** Significant at the 5
percent level. * Significant at the 10 percent level.
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Table A.6: Robustness to Accounting for Potential Soil Productivity
Log GDP
per cap. in
Constraint on
Executive in
Log GDP
per cap. in
Constraint on
Executive in
1990s 1960s 1990s 1990s 1960s 1990s
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Constraint on Executive in 1990s 0.651⇤⇤⇤ 0.578⇤⇤
(0.223) (0.272)
Constraint on Executive in 1900 0.747⇤ 0.471⇤ 0.700 0.416
(0.450) (0.254) (0.474) (0.280)
Log Absolute Latitude -0.465⇤⇤ -0.582⇤⇤ 0.226 -0.447⇤ -0.436 0.331⇤
(0.212) (0.282) (0.179) (0.232) (0.294) (0.185)
Neolithic Transition Timing 0.000 -0.000⇤⇤ -0.000⇤⇤
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Population Density in 1500 CE -0.042 -0.125 -0.115
(0.083) (0.107) (0.094)
Region FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of Observations 56 56 56 56 56 56
Wald Test of  ˆ0 = 1 p-value .57400 .037 .526 .037
AR Test of  ˆ0 = 1 p-value 0.629 0.184 0.591 0.174
First Stage F -Statistic (K-P) 6.457 10.712 10.712 3.337 10.462 10.462
This table presents estimates of the e↵ect of institutions on economic development. The first panel presents
estimates from conventional 2SLS analyses, accounting for the natural logarithm of absolute latitude and
world region fixed e↵ects. Furthermore, the panel presents estimates of the degree of persistence of insti-
tutions from 1900 to the 1960s as well as from 1900 to the 1990s. The second panel presents estimates
based on the augmented estimator, based on GMM estimation, that accounts for the degree of persistence of
institutions, accounting for the natural logarithm of absolute latitude and world region fixed e↵ects. Robust
standard errors are shown in the parentheses. *** Significant at the 1 percent level. ** Significant at the 5
percent level. * Significant at the 10 percent level.
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Table A.7: Institutional Persistence — 1-Year Data — Sample Restricted to Colonies
Constraint on
Executive
Freedom House
Measure of Democracy
Vanhanen Index
of Democracy
OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
First Lag of Constraint on
the Executive
0.946⇤⇤⇤ 0.925⇤⇤⇤
(0.010) (0.013)
First Lag of Freedom House
Measure of Democracy
0.811⇤⇤⇤ 0.795⇤⇤⇤
(0.019) (0.019)
First Lag of Vanhanen Index
of Democratization
0.923⇤⇤⇤ 0.844⇤⇤⇤
(0.013) (0.021)
Year FE No Yes No Yes No Yes
Number of Observations 6,060 6,060 1,768 1,768 5,419 5,419
Number of Countries 60 60 62 62 62 62
Adjusted R2 0.890 0.890 0.660 0.666 0.836 0.843
Signif. of main coe↵.=1 test .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00
This table establishes that the degree of persistence of institutions is below one, accounting for year fixed
e↵ects. The estimation is performed with both OLS as well as the GMM estimator by Arellano and Bond
(1991) where institutions are instrumented using a double lag. Robust standard errors are shown in the
parentheses. *** Significant at the 1 percent level. ** Significant at the 5 percent level. * Significant at
the 10 percent level.
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Table A.8: Institutional Persistence — 5-Year Data — Sample Restricted to Colonies
Constraint on
Executive
Freedom House
Measure of Democracy
Vanhanen Index
of Democracy
OLS OLS GMM OLS OLS GMM OLS OLS GMM
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
First Lag of Constraint on
the Executive
0.707⇤⇤⇤ 0.625⇤⇤⇤ 0.513⇤⇤⇤
(0.048) (0.060) (0.054)
First Lag of Freedom House
Measure of Democracy
0.339⇤⇤⇤ 0.320⇤⇤⇤ 0.331⇤⇤⇤
(0.067) (0.072) (0.116)
First Lag of Vanhanen Index
of Democratization
0.728⇤⇤⇤ 0.462⇤⇤⇤ 0.417⇤⇤⇤
(0.046) (0.065) (0.066)
Year FE No Yes Yes No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Number of Observations 1,152 1,152 1,066 400 400 290 1,061 1,061 997
Number of Countries 60 60 60 62 62 61 62 62 62
Adjusted R2 0.478 0.515 0.133 0.144 0.481 0.590
Signif. of main coe↵.=1 test .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00
This table establishes that the degree of persistence of institutions is below one, accounting for year fixed e↵ects. The estimation is
performed with both OLS as well as the GMM estimator by Arellano and Bond (1991) where institutions are instrumented using a
double lag. Robust standard errors are shown in the parentheses. *** Significant at the 1 percent level. ** Significant at the 5 percent
level. * Significant at the 10 percent level.
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Table A.9: Institutional Persistence — 10-Year Data — Sample Restricted to Colonies
Constraint on
Executive
Freedom House
Measure of Democracy
Vanhanen Index
of Democracy
OLS OLS GMM OLS OLS GMM OLS OLS GMM
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
First Lag of Constraint on
the Executive
0.511⇤⇤⇤ 0.383⇤⇤⇤ 0.329⇤⇤⇤
(0.076) (0.091) (0.084)
First Lag of Freedom House
Measure of Democracy
-0.143 -0.180⇤⇤ 0.106
(0.088) (0.088) (0.191)
First Lag of Vanhanen Index
of Democratization
0.598⇤⇤⇤ 0.222⇤⇤⇤ 0.092
(0.063) (0.068) (0.092)
Year FE No Yes Yes No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Number of Observations 564 564 493 145 145 61 517 517 453
Number of Countries 60 60 60 61 61 61 62 62 62
Adjusted R2 0.237 0.346 0.021 0.058 0.291 0.537
Signif. of main coe↵.=1 test .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00
This table establishes that the degree of persistence of institutions is below one, accounting for year fixed e↵ects. The estimation is
performed with both OLS as well as the GMM estimator by Arellano and Bond (1991) where institutions are instrumented using a
double lag. Robust standard errors are shown in the parentheses. *** Significant at the 1 percent level. ** Significant at the 5 percent
level. * Significant at the 10 percent level.
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Table A.10: Institutional Persistence — 30-Year Data — Sample Restricted to Colonies
Constraint on
Executive
Vanhanen Index
of Democracy
OLS OLS GMM OLS OLS GMM
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
First Lag of Constraint on
the Executive
0.072 0.030 0.609⇤⇤⇤
(0.096) (0.117) (0.192)
First Lag of Vanhanen Index
of Democratization
0.161 -0.285 -0.002
(0.180) (0.223) (0.441)
Year FE No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Number of Observations 162 162 101 106 106 75
Number of Countries 59 59 31 30 30 25
Adjusted R2 -0.003 0.269 0.004 0.241
Signif. of main coe↵.=1 test .00 .00 .04 .00 .00 .02
This table establishes that the degree of persistence of institutions is below one, accounting for year fixed
e↵ects. The estimation is performed with both OLS as well as the GMM estimator by Arellano and Bond
(1991) where institutions are instrumented using a double lag. Robust standard errors are shown in the
parentheses. *** Significant at the 1 percent level. ** Significant at the 5 percent level. * Significant at
the 10 percent level.
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Table A.11: Institutional Persistence — 1-Year Data — Balanced Sample
Constraint on Executive
Freedom House
Measure of Democracy
Vanhanen Index
of Democracy
OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
First Lag of Constraint on
the Executive
0.960⇤⇤⇤ 0.931⇤⇤⇤
(0.006) (0.010)
First Lag of Freedom House
Measure of Democracy
0.783⇤⇤⇤ 0.721⇤⇤⇤
(0.030) (0.039)
First Lag of Vanhanen Index
of Democratization
0.965⇤⇤⇤ 0.909⇤⇤⇤
(0.010) (0.022)
Year FE No Yes No Yes No Yes
Number of Observations 4,578 4,578 725 725 4,195 4,195
Number of Countries 25 25 25 25 25 25
Adjusted R2 0.909 0.911 0.666 0.677 0.908 0.912
Signif. of main coe↵.=1 test .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00
This table establishes that the degree of persistence of institutions is below one, accounting for year fixed
e↵ects. The estimation is performed with both OLS as well as the GMM estimator by Arellano and Bond
(1991) where institutions are instrumented using a double lag. Robust standard errors are shown in the
parentheses. *** Significant at the 1 percent level. ** Significant at the 5 percent level. * Significant at
the 10 percent level.
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Table A.12: Institutional Persistence — 5-Year Data — Balanced Sample
Constraint on
Executive
Freedom House
Measure of Democracy
Vanhanen Index
of Democracy
OLS OLS GMM OLS OLS GMM OLS OLS GMM
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
First Lag of Constraint on
the Executive
0.764⇤⇤⇤ 0.639⇤⇤⇤ 0.500⇤⇤⇤
(0.040) (0.052) (0.057)
First Lag of Freedom House
Measure of Democracy
0.480⇤⇤⇤ 0.475⇤⇤⇤ 0.283⇤⇤
(0.108) (0.116) (0.141)
First Lag of Vanhanen Index
of Democratization
0.874⇤⇤⇤ 0.663⇤⇤⇤ 0.596⇤⇤⇤
(0.031) (0.070) (0.075)
Year FE No Yes Yes No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Number of Observations 888 888 844 192 192 143 833 833 807
Number of Countries 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25
Adjusted R2 0.562 0.609 0.273 0.353 0.673 0.728
Signif. of main coe↵.=1 test .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00
This table establishes that the degree of persistence of institutions is below one, accounting for year fixed e↵ects. The estimation is
performed with both OLS as well as the GMM estimator by Arellano and Bond (1991) where institutions are instrumented using a
double lag. Robust standard errors are shown in the parentheses. *** Significant at the 1 percent level. ** Significant at the 5 percent
level. * Significant at the 10 percent level.
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Table A.13: Institutional Persistence — 10-Year Data — Balanced Sample
Constraint on
Executive
Freedom House
Measure of Democracy
Vanhanen Index
of Democracy
OLS OLS GMM OLS OLS GMM OLS OLS GMM
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
First Lag of Constraint on
the Executive
0.595⇤⇤⇤ 0.421⇤⇤⇤ 0.301⇤⇤⇤
(0.065) (0.071) (0.073)
First Lag of Freedom House
Measure of Democracy
0.245 0.297⇤ 0.052
(0.150) (0.146) (0.110)
First Lag of Vanhanen Index
of Democratization
0.798⇤⇤⇤ 0.470⇤⇤⇤ 0.367⇤⇤
(0.048) (0.099) (0.143)
Year FE No Yes Yes No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Number of Observations 439 439 406 73 73 25 414 414 388
Number of Countries 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25
Adjusted R2 0.326 0.456 0.131 0.277 0.496 0.639
Signif. of main coe↵.=1 test .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00
This table establishes that the degree of persistence of institutions is below one, accounting for year fixed e↵ects. The estimation is
performed with both OLS as well as the GMM estimator by Arellano and Bond (1991) where institutions are instrumented using a
double lag. Robust standard errors are shown in the parentheses. *** Significant at the 1 percent level. ** Significant at the 5 percent
level. * Significant at the 10 percent level.
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Table A.14: Institutional Persistence — 30-Year Data — Balanced Sample
Constraint on
Executive
Vanhanen Index
of Democracy
OLS OLS GMM OLS OLS GMM
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
First Lag of Constraint on
the Executive
0.133⇤⇤ -0.075 0.122
(0.062) (0.071) (0.160)
First Lag of Vanhanen Index
of Democratization
0.782⇤⇤⇤ 0.338 -0.211
(0.220) (0.326) (0.344)
Year FE No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Number of Observations 143 143 118 110 110 85
Number of Countries 25 25 25 24 24 24
Adjusted R2 0.006 0.321 0.197 0.327
Signif. of main coe↵.=1 test .00 .00 .00 .33 .05 .00
This table establishes that the degree of persistence of institutions is below one, accounting for year fixed
e↵ects. The estimation is performed with both OLS as well as the GMM estimator by Arellano and Bond
(1991) where institutions are instrumented using a double lag. Robust standard errors are shown in the
parentheses. *** Significant at the 1 percent level. ** Significant at the 5 percent level. * Significant at
the 10 percent level.
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Table A.15: Institutional Persistence — 1-Year Data — All Countries — Including Post-1965
Interaction Term
Constraint on
Executive
Vanhanen Index
of Democracy
OLS OLS OLS OLS
(1) (2) (3) (4)
First Lag of Constraint on
the Executive
0.960⇤⇤⇤ 0.949⇤⇤⇤
(0.006) (0.007)
First Lag of Vanhanen Index
of Democratization
0.953⇤⇤⇤ 0.919⇤⇤⇤
(0.010) (0.012)
Interaction Term (Post-1965) -0.023⇤⇤⇤ -0.032⇤⇤⇤ -0.014⇤⇤ -0.001
(0.006) (0.007) (0.006) (0.006)
Level Shift in 1965 0.185⇤⇤⇤ 0.827⇤⇤⇤
(0.032) (0.093)
Year FE No Yes No Yes
Number of Observations 14,117 14,117 12,012 12,012
Number of Countries 158 158 163 163
Adjusted R2 0.912 0.913 0.913 0.915
Signif. of main coe↵.=1 test .00 .00 .00 .00
Signif. of unit root test (P-P) .01 .00
This table establishes that the degree of persistence of institutions is below one,
accounting for year fixed e↵ects. The estimation is performed with both OLS
as well as the GMM estimator by Arellano and Bond (1991) where institutions
are instrumented using a double lag. Robust standard errors are shown in the
parentheses. *** Significant at the 1 percent level. ** Significant at the 5 percent
level. * Significant at the 10 percent level.
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Table A.16: Institutional Persistence — 5-Year Data — All Countries — Including Post-1965
Interaction Term
Constraint on
Executive
Vanhanen Index
of Democracy
OLS OLS GMM OLS OLS GMM
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
First Lag of Constraint on
the Executive
0.790⇤⇤⇤ 0.749⇤⇤⇤ 0.540⇤⇤⇤
(0.027) (0.030) (0.043)
First Lag of Vanhanen Index
of Democratization
0.850⇤⇤⇤ 0.736⇤⇤⇤ 0.671⇤⇤⇤
(0.035) (0.040) (0.046)
Interaction Term (Post-1965) -0.107⇤⇤⇤ -0.136⇤⇤⇤ -0.078⇤⇤ -0.080⇤⇤⇤ -0.031 -0.070⇤⇤⇤
(0.031) (0.033) (0.037) (0.025) (0.022) (0.024)
Level Shift in 1965 0.910⇤⇤⇤ 3.611⇤⇤⇤
(0.160) (0.429)
Year FE No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Number of Observations 2,625 2,625 2,388 2,324 2,324 2,145
Number of Countries 158 158 158 162 162 144
Adjusted R2 0.601 0.626 0.711 0.734
Signif. of main coe↵.=1 test .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00
Signif. of unit root test (P-P) .14 .00
This table establishes that the degree of persistence of institutions is below one, accounting for year fixed
e↵ects. The estimation is performed with both OLS as well as the GMM estimator by Arellano and Bond
(1991) where institutions are instrumented using a double lag. Robust standard errors are shown in the
parentheses. *** Significant at the 1 percent level. ** Significant at the 5 percent level. * Significant at
the 10 percent level.
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Table A.17: Institutional Persistence — 10-Year Data — All Countries — Including Post-1965
Interaction Term
Constraint on
Executive
Vanhanen Index
of Democracy
OLS OLS GMM OLS OLS GMM
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
First Lag of Constraint on
the Executive
0.622⇤⇤⇤ 0.560⇤⇤⇤ 0.388⇤⇤⇤
(0.050) (0.051) (0.072)
First Lag of Vanhanen Index
of Democratization
0.790⇤⇤⇤ 0.606⇤⇤⇤ 0.460⇤⇤⇤
(0.062) (0.070) (0.119)
Interaction Term (Post-1965) -0.204⇤⇤⇤ -0.236⇤⇤⇤ -0.100⇤ -0.158⇤⇤⇤ -0.055 -0.002
(0.051) (0.050) (0.060) (0.052) (0.051) (0.046)
Level Shift in 1965 1.675⇤⇤⇤ 5.683⇤⇤⇤
(0.256) (0.812)
Year FE No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Number of Observations 1,258 1,258 1,057 1,113 1,113 958
Number of Countries 157 157 137 144 144 139
Adjusted R2 0.386 0.456 0.595 0.653
Signif. of main coe↵.=1 test .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00
Signif. of unit root test (P-P) .00 .00
This table establishes that the degree of persistence of institutions is below one, accounting for year fixed
e↵ects. The estimation is performed with both OLS as well as the GMM estimator by Arellano and Bond
(1991) where institutions are instrumented using a double lag. Robust standard errors are shown in the
parentheses. *** Significant at the 1 percent level. ** Significant at the 5 percent level. * Significant at
the 10 percent level.
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Table A.18: Institutional Persistence — 30-Year Data — All Countries — Including Post-1965
Interaction Term
Constraint on
Executive
Vanhanen Index
of Democracy
OLS OLS GMM OLS OLS GMM
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
First Lag of Constraint on
the Executive
0.341⇤⇤⇤ 0.247⇤⇤⇤ 0.468⇤⇤⇤
(0.071) (0.080) (0.143)
First Lag of Vanhanen Index
of Democratization
1.196⇤⇤⇤ 0.818⇤⇤⇤ 0.467
(0.177) (0.170) (0.318)
Interaction Term (Post-1965) -0.456⇤⇤⇤ -0.371⇤⇤⇤ -0.200⇤ -0.543⇤⇤⇤ -0.244⇤ -0.033
(0.063) (0.061) (0.117) (0.155) (0.143) (0.148)
Level Shift in 1965 3.139⇤⇤⇤ 3.832⇤
(0.356) (2.037)
Year FE No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Number of Observations 374 374 236 232 232 160
Number of Countries 131 131 73 71 71 54
Adjusted R2 0.243 0.409 0.461 0.528
Signif. of main coe↵.=1 test .00 .00 .00 .27 .29 .09
Signif. of unit root test (P-P) .25 .9
This table establishes that the degree of persistence of institutions is below one, accounting for year fixed
e↵ects. The estimation is performed with both OLS as well as the GMM estimator by Arellano and Bond
(1991) where institutions are instrumented using a double lag. Robust standard errors are shown in the
parentheses. *** Significant at the 1 percent level. ** Significant at the 5 percent level. * Significant at
the 10 percent level.
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Table A.19: Institutional Persistence — 1-Year Data — Alternative Measures of Institutions
Democracy Autocracy
Vanhanen Index
of Competition
OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
First Lag of
Democracy
0.968⇤⇤⇤ 0.948⇤⇤⇤
(0.004) (0.006)
First Lag of
Autocracy
0.962⇤⇤⇤ 0.943⇤⇤⇤
(0.004) (0.006)
First Lag of Vanhanen Index
of Competition
0.880⇤⇤⇤ 0.829⇤⇤⇤
(0.011) (0.011)
Year FE No Yes No Yes No Yes
Number of Observations 14,117 14,117 14,117 14,117 12,012 12,012
Number of Countries 158 158 158 158 163 163
Adjusted R2 0.933 0.934 0.923 0.924 0.771 0.780
Signif. of unit root test .00 .00 .00
Signif. of main coe↵.=1 test .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00
This table establishes that the degree of persistence of institutions is below one, accounting for year fixed
e↵ects. The estimation is performed with both OLS as well as the GMM estimator by Arellano and Bond
(1991) where institutions are instrumented using a double lag. Robust standard errors are shown in the
parentheses. *** Significant at the 1 percent level. ** Significant at the 5 percent level. * Significant at
the 10 percent level.
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Table A.20: Institutional Persistence — 1-Year Data — Alternative Measures of Institutions
Democracy Autocracy
Vanhanen Index
of Competition
OLS OLS GMM OLS OLS GMM OLS OLS GMM
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
First Lag of
Democracy
0.833⇤⇤⇤ 0.747⇤⇤⇤ 0.563⇤⇤⇤
(0.022) (0.029) (0.050)
First Lag of
Autocracy
0.802⇤⇤⇤ 0.725⇤⇤⇤ 0.587⇤⇤⇤
(0.023) (0.029) (0.048)
First Lag of Vanhanen Index
of Competition
0.595⇤⇤⇤ 0.428⇤⇤⇤ 0.368⇤⇤⇤
(0.037) (0.041) (0.044)
Year FE No Yes Yes No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Number of Observations 2,625 2,625 2,388 2,625 2,625 2,388 2,324 2,324 2,145
Number of Countries 158 158 158 158 158 158 162 162 144
Adjusted R2 0.669 0.695 0.620 0.652 0.334 0.428
Signif. of unit root test .00 .00 .00
Signif. of main coe↵.=1 test .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00
This table establishes that the degree of persistence of institutions is below one, accounting for year fixed e↵ects. The estimation is
performed with both OLS as well as the GMM estimator by Arellano and Bond (1991) where institutions are instrumented using a
double lag. Robust standard errors are shown in the parentheses. *** Significant at the 1 percent level. ** Significant at the 5 percent
level. * Significant at the 10 percent level.
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Table A.21: Institutional Persistence — 1-Year Data — Alternative Measures of Institutions
Democracy Autocracy
Vanhanen Index
of Competition
OLS OLS GMM OLS OLS GMM OLS OLS GMM
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
First Lag of
Democracy
0.696⇤⇤⇤ 0.540⇤⇤⇤ 0.374⇤⇤⇤
(0.040) (0.049) (0.091)
First Lag of
Autocracy
0.620⇤⇤⇤ 0.490⇤⇤⇤ 0.377⇤⇤⇤
(0.040) (0.044) (0.061)
First Lag of Vanhanen Index
of Competition
0.444⇤⇤⇤ 0.217⇤⇤⇤ 0.161⇤⇤
(0.052) (0.056) (0.079)
Year FE No Yes Yes No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Number of Observations 1,258 1,258 1,057 1,258 1,258 1,057 1,113 1,113 958
Number of Countries 157 157 137 157 157 137 144 144 139
Adjusted R2 0.445 0.527 0.359 0.452 0.178 0.364
Signif. of unit root test .00 .00 .00
Signif. of main coe↵.=1 test .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00
This table establishes that the degree of persistence of institutions is below one, accounting for year fixed e↵ects. The estimation is
performed with both OLS as well as the GMM estimator by Arellano and Bond (1991) where institutions are instrumented using a
double lag. Robust standard errors are shown in the parentheses. *** Significant at the 1 percent level. ** Significant at the 5 percent
level. * Significant at the 10 percent level.
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Table A.22: Institutional Persistence — 1-Year Data — Alternative Measures of Institutions
Democracy Autocracy
Vanhanen Index
of Competition
OLS OLS GMM OLS OLS GMM OLS OLS GMM
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
First Lag of
Democracy
0.339⇤⇤⇤ 0.110 0.334
(0.085) (0.083) (0.212)
First Lag of
Autocracy
0.240⇤⇤ 0.117 0.399⇤⇤
(0.094) (0.077) (0.167)
First Lag of Vanhanen Index
of Competition
0.180⇤⇤ -0.167 -0.151
(0.084) (0.102) (0.232)
Year FE No Yes Yes No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Number of Observations 374 374 236 374 374 236 232 232 160
Number of Countries 131 131 73 131 131 73 71 71 54
Adjusted R2 0.086 0.377 0.048 0.308 0.027 0.254
Signif. of unit root test .99 .01 .00
Signif. of main coe↵.=1 test .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00
This table establishes that the degree of persistence of institutions is below one, accounting for year fixed e↵ects. The estimation is
performed with both OLS as well as the GMM estimator by Arellano and Bond (1991) where institutions are instrumented using a
double lag. Robust standard errors are shown in the parentheses. *** Significant at the 1 percent level. ** Significant at the 5 percent
level. * Significant at the 10 percent level.
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